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Unemployment Duration and Heterogenous




Return to employment, after a period of unemployment, is analyzed for a
large sample of Swedish occupationally disabled workers. A piece-wise con-
stant model is used, extended to allow for Gamma heterogeneity. Three
competing exits from unemployment are accounted for; regular employment,
sheltered/subsidized employment and withdrawal from the labor force. The
model is also generalized by accounting for di¤ering search behavior within
the population.
Thehazardrateisconstant orslightly increasingovertime, forexit tosome
kind of employment. However, for exit from unemployment by leaving the la-
bor force, the hazard shows quite strong positive duration dependence. Men
tend to be more probable to leave unemployment for regular employment,
and less probable than women to leave the labor force. The probability of
…nding regular employment is smallest for workers with psychological disabil-
ities, whilehigh-school oruniversity education as well as previous professional
experience increases the hazard rate for regular employment.
The heterogeneity due to di¤ering search behavior appears to be at least
as important as the Gamma heterogeneity. The estimated probabilities of no
search for oneparticular exit varies, across exits and subsamples, between 0.0
and 0.4.
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There are multiple roles for Swedish Labour market policy. First, a stabilizing role,
to provide employment and …nancial assistance in a contra cyclic way. Second, an
active policy aims at increasing the e¢ciency on the labour market, providing a
labour force with adequate skills. Third, there is a distributional role which means
policies directed to individuals with a weak position on the labour market, aiming
at achieving a more even income distribution.
Among the priority groups having the weakest positions on the labour market
are, forexample, immigrants, individuals with littleor noeducation, andtheoccupa-
tionally disabled oroccupationally handicapped. The latter group is the focus of this
paper. According to the de…nitions of the World Health Organization (WHO)1 “a
handicap is a disadvantage resulting from an impairment or disability”. This means
that regarding an individual’s working life, an impairment may be a handicap for
one kind of profession, but not for others. Further, the prejudicial attitudes toward
individuals with impairments, may make an individual handicapped by limiting his
opportunities on the labour market. The policy used by the Swedish employment
o¢ces coincides with the de…nition of WHO; an impairment which (negatively) in-
‡uences the individual’s professional life is considered a “disability”, and the same
de…nition will be used throughout this paper.
In Sweden about 700,000 individuals aged 16 to 64 years are considered occupa-
tionally disabled (1996), corresponding to about 12 percent of the working popula-
tion.2 The non-disabled working population are employed to 75 percent, while the
corresponding …gure for the disabled working population is only 48 percent. The
disabled have been overrepresented in the registers of unemployed for a long time.
This means that during the recession of the 90’s, the increase in registration for
the disabled has been smaller (plus 70 percent) than for the non-disabled (plus 250
percent).
Some of the disabled are given disability pension, often after a longer period on
the sick-list. The number of new early (or disability) retirements has been about
40,000-50,000 individuals every year since 1980, with quite large ‡uctuations. A
peak was reached in 1993 when about 60,000 were given early retirement, and of
which 37,000 were aged 40-59 years. Earlier, it was possible to grant an individual
1 See e.g. Baldwin and Johnson (1993).
2 All …gures given here are found in o¢cial statistics from the National Labour Market Board
in Sweden (available in Swedish only).
1early retirement, motivated only by his poor opportunities on the labour market.
This possibility was removed by law in 1991, though it says that it may still be in
use in practice.
According to the …gures given above, the labour market situation is troublesome
for disabled workers. The disabled workers have also since many years been an im-
portant priority group for active labor market policy in Sweden. However, it is also
a fact that when evaluating Swedish policy programs, the handling of the disabled
has usually been rudimentary. In Carling et al. (1996)3 all disabled individuals were
excluded from a large dataset of Swedish unemployed, probably because the dis-
abled are suspected to di¤er from non-disabled unemployed, in many and important
respects. With a simple dummy variable technique it has been found, for example,
that the disabled workers make in practice a priority group for labor market training
and that disabled participants also gain considerably from such a program (Brännäs
and Eriksson, 1996). However, the special conditions facing disabled workers ought
to be given some attention.
I will analyze unemployment duration for a large sample of Swedish disabled
workers, in which everyone registered at a local employment o¢ce during 1992. The
analysis will not include any disabled who manage without the service of an employ-
ment o¢ce. Neither will I include disabled workers who had withdrawn from the
labour market (due to retirement, etc.) before 1992. I am interested in unemploy-
ment duration among the disabled workers and the duration ends when the workers
leave unemployment.4 I will allow for three unique exits from unemployment; regu-
lar employment, sheltered or subsidized employment, and …nally, withdrawal from
the labor force. For non-disabled workers the exit to subsidized/sheltered employ-
ment is not of importance, while we shall see that 20 percent of the disabled leave
unemployment this way.
The occupationally disabled form a very heterogenous group, maybe an even
more heterogenous group than the non-disabled. An occupationally disabled worker
may mean anyone from a skilled person in a wheel chair, competing for high skill
jobs, to a person with severe disabilities, who will never be able to …nd regular em-
3 This paper will serve as an important reference, since it analyzes Swedish non-disabled un-
employed workers, who were registered as unemployed at about the same time as the disabled
unemployed of this paper. One important di¤erence between the papers is that Carling et al.
include individuals aged 16-55, while the present paper will set the lower age limit at 25 years.
4 I will assume that “unemployment” means “time as registered at a local employment o¢ce”.
An unemployed individual may be openly unemployed or participate in policy programs. Se further
section 2.3.
2ployment, but is directed to e.g. sheltered employment. I will use a model allowing
for di¤ering search behavior across individuals, in order to take into consideration
this heterogeneity among the disabled.
A few important aspects of unemployment durations are discussed in section 2;
duration dependence, individual heterogeneity, in…nite durations, and policy pro-
gram participation during unemployment. The dataset to be analyzed will be de-
scribed in section 3. In section 4 the econometric model to be used is presented.
Empirical results follow in section 5 with concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Unemployment duration
2.1 Escape from unemployment and duration dependence
A variable of vital interest to an unemployed worker is the time spent as unem-
ployed, i.e. the unemployment duration. Besides that unemployment may mean
lower income during the spell itself, it may also a¤ect future labor market prospects
negatively (see e.g. Edinand Holmlund, 1991, Heckmanand Borjas, 1980). The risk
(or chance, rather) of leaving unemployment is often described by the hazard rate,
which is the probability of leaving unemployment in the next in…nitesimal period,
conditional on the individual is still unemployed.
Whenever the hazard is not constant over time, there is duration dependence.
Positive duration dependence means that the hazard increases by time, while with
negative duration dependence the hazard decreases over time. Some argue that
the probability of leaving unemployment decreases with the length of the spell (e.g.
Lancaster, 1990) but others claim the opposite. Carling et al. (1996) and Hui
(1991) for example, show that the escape rate from unemployment increases, as the
exhaustion time of bene…ts is getting closer. This phenomenon can be addressed
to two e¤ects; the search activities of the unemployed increases and his reservation
wage decreases. Thus, the formation of the bene…t system, like the Swedish with
…xed duration of bene…ts, can actually induce this observed duration dependence.
Considering the hazard rate of disabled unemployed workers, where the hazard
re‡ects escape from unemployment and to employment, the shape of the hazard
will depend on how we de…ne “employment”. First, if “employment” is de…ned as
employment on the regular labor market only, we expect duration dependence to be
negative. That is, individuals who can …nd a regular job is expected to do this rather
3quickly. The probability of …nding such a job then decreases with the length of the
unemployment spell, due to depreciation of knowledge and work experience, due to
stigma caused by unemployment or due to “passivity” and thereby a lower search
intensity. Regular employment may mean both recall to a former employer and
employment with a new employer.5 According to several studies (see e.g. Han and
Hausman, 1990, and their references) it is wise to treat recalls to former employer
and newjobs separately, however in this study, recalls will be treatedas other regular
employment.6
Some disabled unemployed may not be able to …nd regular employment in the
nearest future, due to the severity of their disability. This group of unemployed may
have to rely on employment aimed in particular (but not exclusively) at disabled,
such as sheltered employment and employment with wage subsidies. For leaving
unemployment to this kind of subsidized/sheltered employment, a positive duration
dependence is expected. The longer the unemployment spell, the more e¤orts are
probably made by the unemployed and/or the o¢cial at the employment o¢ce, to
…nd some kind of employment if regular employment is not an available option.
Finally, theunemployedcan leaveunemployment by withdrawingfromthelabour
force through early retirement, by …nding education outside the domain of the em-
ployment o¢ces, etc. To leave unemployment in this way is also expected to show
positive duration dependence, due to e¤orts of the employment o¢cer as time in
unemployment spell is increasing, or due to the decision to retire, as other oppor-
tunities have failed. From the data to be used in the empirical application, we will
unfortunately not have information on whether each individual’s withdrawal from
the labor force is permanent (e.g. retirement) or temporary (e.g. university studies).
In the empirical application, three excluding exits will be accounted for; regular
employment, sheltered or subsidized employment, and withdrawal from the labor
force. To allow for full ‡exibility and non-monotonicity of the hazard rate, a piece-
wise constant speci…cation will be used (see further section 4).
5 According to a Swedish study by Harkman and Jansson (1995), in a sample of non-disabled
unemployed, as many as 45 percent of a who found employment in 1994, were re-employed by a
former employer. The authors assume that the recalls is one important explanation to low search
intensity among Swedish unemployed, compared to unemployed in other European countries.
6 According to informal information from the National Labour Market Board, recalls are highly
under-reported in the database to be used, and do not serve to re‡ect true recalls.
42.2 Heterogeneity and allowing for in…nite durations
Unobserved heterogeneity among individuals is always present when not all char-
acteristics of importance can be observed (by the observer). Heterogeneity may be
even more important for disabled unemployed, than for non-disabled. Most im-
portant, the impairment caused by a disability is unobservable to us, and to some
extent unobservable also to potential employers. The impairment caused by a spe-
ci…c disability is di¢cult to foretell, which may be one explanation to why disabled
are discriminated on the labor market (see e.g. Baldwin and Johnson, 1993). Not
controlling for heterogeneity when modelling duration will lead to biased inference
of the duration dependence (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990).
For duration analysis allowing for heterogeneity, a so called mixture model is the
most common tool. According to Lancaster (1990, Ch. 4) there are three expla-
nations for the emergence of a so called mixture models allowing for heterogeneity;
error in recorded durations, error in recorded regressors and, …nally, the common
explanation of omitted variables. In the data to be used here, there are probably
some errors in recorded durations.7 However, unobservable and therefore omitted
regressors is probably the most important source of heterogeneity. Many character-
istics of the unemployed which are unobservable to us, the degree of the disability,
ambition, motivation, etc., are important factors for the unemployed’s opportunities
on the labour market. According to Lancaster (1979) we may also interpret hetero-
geneity as that individuals search for en exit from unemployment under uncertainty,
and individuals are unequally lucky in their search.
Another way to allow for heterogeneity is to assume that the search behavior
di¤ers across individuals. Some disabled individuals are unemployed for the same
reasons as any non-disabled individual with similar quali…cations. They will be
between jobs for some time, while searching for regular employment and nothing
else. On the other hand, some disabled individuals have severe disabilities and will
never be able to get regular employment, why this alternative is not even searched
for. Instead, subsidized/sheltered employment or the like may be a more realistic
option for escaping unemployment.
If there is a positive probability that a particular exit route is not relevant to
every individual in the population, there is a positive probability that latent du-
7 For example, an unemployed who gets a regular job may wait a few days until he informs
the employment o¢cial. At recording the job in the database, the o¢cial may use the date when
he got the information, and not the true date which is a week earlier. For modelling of errors in
durations, see Brännäs (1996).
5rations (i.e. latent due to censoring) may be in…nite, rather than drawn from a
conventional distribution. This “defective risk problem” can be thought of as a
multi-sector search model, in which some individuals never search in certain sectors.
Pudney and Thomas (1995) model two competing exit routes from unemployment;
re-employment in former industrial sector and employment in a di¤erent industrial
sector, where the two categories are addressed as sectorial “stayers” and “movers”,
respectively. By accounting for that not everyone in their sample chooses freely
between “staying” and “moving”, Pudney and Thomas introduce a model where
actual search may be limited to only one of the two sectors.
In the empirical analysis I will account for two kinds of heterogeneity; the kind
of heterogeneity assumed in a so called mixture model and heterogeneity in the form
of di¤erences in search behavior.
2.3 Participation in policy programs during unemployment
In most studies on unemployment duration among Swedish workers the term “un-
employed” has been used in the meaning of “openly unemployed” and participation
in a policy program (training, relief work, etc.) has been treated as an exit from
unemployment. This de…nition is made in for example Carling et al. (1996), Edin
(1989) and Edin and Holmlund (1991). However, in this study I will assume that
unemployment is the sum of time spent in open unemployment and time spent in
policy programs and I will explain the reason for this assumption below.
Lately in Sweden, akeeninterest has been shown inthe situationof the long-term
unemployed. In late 1998 a project was initiated by the Ministry of Labour, focused
exclusively on “long-term registered unemployed”, meaning workers registered at
employment o¢ces for two years or more. In these two years, both time as open
unemployed and time spent in policy programs are included. In 1998 there were
close to 100,000 long-term unemployed, according to this de…nition. This group has
grown fast during the recession of the 90’s, and while the unemployment rate is now
falling, the group of long-term unemployed is still growing. The Ministry concludes
that very few in this group appear to …nd regular employment, but tend to be in a
vicious circle of policy programs and open unemployment, far from the regular labor
market. The aim of the project is to make a survey of the long-term unemployed and
to determine the factors leading to these very long unemployment spells. We shall
see that in the sample of disabledto be used inthis paper, as many as 25 percent are
long-term unemployed according to the de…nition of the Ministry of Labour. Thus,
6when analyzing long-term unemployment, the di¢cult labor market situation of the
disabled is one contributor to the observed problem.
The Government concern described above partly stems from the fact that there
is reason to believe that total time in unemployment and not just time in open
unemployment, will in‡uence future labor market prospects of unemployed. A long
periodof unemployment may be stigmatizing evenifsome part of it is spent in active
policy programs. Total time in unemploymentwill alsohavean impact onthehuman
capital decay, the work experience, the lifetime income pro…le, etc., even though
policy programs aim at decreasing these negative consequences of unemployment.
Whenassuming that unemployment durationincludes time spentinactive policy
programs, the individuals to be analyzed will di¤er in their policy program history
when leaving unemployment. Modelling selection into (and also out of) policy pro-
grams in duration models, is a very complicated task (see Gritz, 1993, Ham and
LaLonde, 1996). I will here avoid the selection matter by dividing the sample by
policy program history, and estimate the model for more homogenous subsamples
separately.
3 Data
The sample to be analyzed in this paper consists of disabled workers who registered
at a local employment o¢ce during 1992. I have limited the analysis to include
workers between 25 and 55 years of age. By these exceptions the sample to be
used consists of 32,609 individuals8 and I will analyze their …rst unemployment spell
starting in 1992. This …rst unemployment spell ended when the individual was
deactivated from the register of unemployed. Reasons for deactivation is some kind
ofemployment, retirementor that theindividual loosescontact with the employment
o¢ce for some other (known or unknown) reason. The data runs until January 1996
whichmeans that everyone not deactivatedat that time will betreated as a censored
observation. Only the …rst unemployment spell will be analyzed. i.e. if a worker
gets a job and then returns as unemployed after a while, the second spell is not
included in the analysis.
8 The younger group is excluded in order to avoid unemployed who have not yet established
themselves on the labour market, and the older group to avoid early retirements quite close to the
time of regular retirements. Individuals outside the age interval and those who lacked important
pieces of data or had contradictory labour market histories, have been excluded from the original
sample of about 70,000 individuals.
7Table I: Statistical mean of individual characteristics, by handicap. All descriptive
statistics refer to characteristics of the individuals at onset of unemployment spell
(1992).
Variable and its mean, by disability Physical Other Total
Male (=1) 0.52 0.72 0.59
Age 39.04 36.76 38.28
Entitled to unemployment insurance (=1) 0.60 0.30 0.50
Entitled to cash assistance (=1) 0.05 0.05 0.05
Nordic citizen, not Swedish (=1) 0.03 0.05 0.04
Foreign citizen, not Nordic (=1) 0.07 0.05 0.06
High school education (=1) 0.41 0.26 0.36
University education (=1) 0.05 0.03 0.04
Some experience in profession (=1) 0.21 0.25 0.22
Long experience in profession (=1) 0.39 0.24 0.34
Unemployment rate 4.85 4.74 4.81
“Disability rate” 21.44 20.40 21.09
“Program rate” 10.89 10.25 10.68
n 21,789 10,820 32,609
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table I, for those with a physical and a
non-physical disability, respectively. About two thirds have a physical disability,
and the remaining third other than physical disability.9 I will also include three
variables at the municipal level, in order to take into account local labor market
variation. These variables are unemployment rate (openly unemployed), “disability
rate” (openly unemployed with a disability) and “program rate” (total number of
unemployed who enter policy programs). The unemployment rate is the number of
unemployed in relation to the local population aged 16-64, while the other rates are
in relation to open unemployment. All …gures are means across months in 1992 and
expressed in percentages.
The unemployment rate is expected to have a negative impact on the proba-
bility to leave unemployment. The disability rate measures “competition” between
disabled at the local labor market. A high disability rate may either increase un-
employment duration (since more disabled workers compete for regular and subsi-
dized/sheltered jobs) or decrease duration (since more disabled unemployed with-
draw from the labor force due to poor opportunities, the so called discouragement
9 It should be noted that each worker can have only one code for disability in the register, even
if he is in reality multi-handicapped.
8e¤ect). Finally, the program rate should mean shorter unemployment spells, pro-
vided that policy programs have the desired e¤ect of leading to better matching of
the unemployed to existing jobs. On the other hand if the local employment of-
…ces tend to o¤er policy programs as substitutes for regular or subsidized/sheltered
employment, a high program rate may mean delayed exit from unemployment.
Table II: Shares with di¤erent length of unemployment spells, with mean length of
spells. For new entrants into unemployment in 1992.
Length of unemployment spells, by disability Physical Other Total
> 90 days 0.862 0.749 0.824
> 180 days 0.739 0.569 0.682
> 365 days 0.542 0.342 0.475
> 420 days 0.492 0.301 0.429
> 730 dagar 0.306 0.151 0.254
Censored spells 0.151 0.057 0.120
Mean, including censored spells¤ (n = 32;609) 545 357 483
Mean, excluding censored spells (n = 28;708) 410 300 371
¤ For the censored cases the number of days until the date of censoring
has been used, meaning a maximum of 1,492 days.
In Table II some descriptive statistics of unemployment spells are presented. As
many as 68percent in our sampleareunemployedfor morethansix months.10 Nearly
half of the sample are unemployed for more than a year. After 420 calendar days
the unemployment insurance bene…ts expire, for those who are eligible.11 About
25 percent of the sample are long-term unemployed according to the Government
de…nition mentioned earlier; a total time as registered exceeding two years.
There were ten di¤erent policy programs the unemployed may have been in
during their unemployment spell. A very important source of heterogeneity among
the unemployed of our sample, is their di¤erences in policy program participation
during the unemployment spell. To avoid the complicated endogeneity problem
of program participation when exit from unemployment is analyzed, the sample
will be divided by program participation history. We divide the sample into four
subsamples, in which the workers have participated in (A) zero programs, (B) only
vocational rehabilitation, (C) one program other than vocational rehabilitation, and
10 This is the de…nition of long term unemployment, as stated by the National Labour Market
Board, if the worker is 25 years or older (which holds for everyone in our sample).
11 Participation in some policy programs, for example labor market training, ensures the partic-
ipant a new period of bene…ts, if participation exceeds six months.
9(D) two or more programs, respectively. Table III presents shares with di¤erent
policy program histories. We observe that workers with physical disabilities tend to
participate in more programs, than do workers with psychological disabilities.
Table III: Subsamples with di¤erent policy program histories. Estimations will be
made for the four subsamples separately.
History Physical Other Total
A. No program 0.439 0.575 0.484
B. Only vocational rehabilitation 0.154 0.131 0.146
C. One program other than rehabilitation 0.192 0.177 0.187
D. Two or more programs 0.215 0.117 0.183
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000
n 21,789 10,820 32,609
In Table IV we summarize how the unemployment spells end. About 14 percent
ofour sample found regular employment while 20 percent were deactivated for subsi-
dized or sheltered employment meant particularly (but not exclusively) for disabled
workers.12 As many as 41 percent withdrew from the labour force (i.e. education
outside the employment o¢ce, retirement and other known reasons) while 24 per-
cent are censored (including those who lost contact with the employment o¢ce for
unknown reason). Finally, in Table V we summarize exits by the workers program
histories.
Table IV: Reasons for deactivation of an unemployed, i.e. reasons for ending an
unemployment spell.
Reason for end of spell, by disability Physical Other Total
Regular employment, including recalls 0.173 0.082 0.142
Sheltered/subsidized employment 0.197 0.214 0.203
Non-particpation in labor force 0.384 0.462 0.410
Censored including lost contact 0.246 0.242 0.245
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000
n 21,789 10,820 32,609
12 These are, with their respective size in our sample in parenthesis, wage subsidy (14 percent),
sheltered employment at Samhall (3.7 percent) and public sheltered employment (2.6 percent).
104 Econometric issues
Pudney and Thomas (1995) present a competing risks (CR) model allowing for
two important departures from the simplest modelling; unobserved heterogeneity
among individuals and the existence of in…nite expected durations. I will extend
the model proposed by Pudney and Thomas, in which I will assume three unique
exits from unemployment; regular employment including recall, sheltered/subsidized
employment and non-participation including retirement.13 The original model is
extended to a piecewise constant speci…cation of the base-line hazard, in which I
also allow for unobserved Gamma heterogeneity.
4.1 Hazard functions
The risk (or chance rather) of leaving unemployment can be described by the haz-
ard rate, h(tjx;µ), which is the probability of leaving unemployment in the next
in…nitesimal period, conditional on that the individual is still unemployed, i.e.
h(tjx;µ) = lim
¢! 0









Here, f(tjx;µ) is the density function of t and S(tjx;µ) is the survivor function, i.e.
the probability that the unemployment spell will last until at least t, while x is a
vector of individual speci…c characteristics and µ is a parameter vector. With q
di¤erent risks, or exit routes, and tj the time until occurrence of the j:th risk, the
observed duration is
t = min(t1;:::;tq)
and the observed exit r is
r = argminftjg; j = 1;:::;q:
For a moment, let us restrict the exposition to one exit only. If we suppress the
conditioning on x and µ, and denote the hazard rate with h(t), the survivor function
can be expressed as
S(t) = 1 ¡F(t) = exp(¡¤(t)): (2)
13 Unfortunately there is no code speci…cally for deactivation due to retirement (i.e. early or
disability retirement). Disability retirement and unemployment as possible substitutes is discussed
and modelled for the case of Germany in Riphahn (1997).










Let us represent the hazard rate by two components, as
h(tjx) = h0(t)¸(x) (4)
where h0(t) is the so called base-line hazard, while ¸(x) is an individual speci…c
component. Pudney and Thomas (1995) start by assuming a so called Weibull
hazard function in which the base-line is either constant over time, monotonically
increasing or monotonically decreasing over time. The authors conclude that the
assumedmonotonicity is too simple to capture their data andpass onto atwo-regime
speci…cation with constant base-line within the two intervals.14 For the individual-
speci…c part of thehazardI will use the most commonspeci…cation; ¸(x) = exp(x¯).
To allow for full ‡exibility of the base-line, I will use a piece-wise constant (PC)
hazard model (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990). This means that for the base-line hazard
the time axis is divided into M intervals;
h0(t) =
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µM if cM¡1 < t < 1
(5)
where µk are constants while ck are de…ne points in time, and 0 < c1 < c2 < ::: <
cM¡1 < 1. A convenient speci…cation is to use µk = exp(°k) which means that the
hazard may be written as
h(tjx) = ¸(x)exp(dk°k) = exp(x¯ + dk°k) (6)
where the dummy variable dk = 1 if duration t falls within the interval (ck¡1;ck],
and dk = 0 otherwise. Assuming only time-invariant variables in x, the integrated
14 According to preliminary results for the data of this study, the Weibull hazard produce the
same diagnostics as in Pudney and Thomas; an unrealistically large value of the Weibull parameter.








bkµk + (t¡ cm)µm+1
#
(7)
where bk = ck ¡ ck¡1, cm < t ￿ cm+1 and m = 0;1;:::;M ¡ 1. The density function
in turn is
f(tjx) = h(tjx)S(tjx):
De…ne ci = 1 if the duration of individual i is uncensored and ci = 0 otherwise. The








which is maximized with respect to ¯ and °k in eq.(7).
4.2 Multiple exit routes and allowing for in…nite durations
Assume that there are several exit routes from unemployment and that the set
of exogenous variables, x, their impact on duration, ¯, and also the time speci…c
constants, °k, are allowed to vary across exit routes. Each individual will leave
unemployment through at most one exit route. De…ne rij = 1 if individual i exits
through route j and rij = 0 otherwise. The dummy variable ci =
P
jrij equals
one for the uncensored observations while ci = 0 for those who have experienced a
duration exceeding a maximum limit, say tmax, for all q exits. The log-likelihood





















As long as independence between exits is assumed, ML estimation of the q durations
can be made separately.
Now, we will allow for in…nite durations stemming from the fact that all q exit
routes mightnotberelevant toeveryone inthe population. Let Pij be theprobability
that exit route j is not relevant to individual i, i.e. the probability that duration
tij is in…nite. Whenever one or several Pij:s are positive, we have a defective risk
problem, which is characterized by
lim
t!1S(t) > 0
13(see Lancaster, 1990, p. 9). In a “standard” CR model, the probability of an ob-
servation to be censored originates from the probability of surviving exits. When
allowing for in…nite durations, the probability of censoring will be more complicated.
We must now take into account that censoring may stem from both surviving exits
and from not even searching particular exits routes (i.e. in…nite durations). With
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where Pr(ci = 1) is the probability that individual i is censored. Assuming three
exits, suppressing individual indices and using the notation P1 = Pr(t1 = 1),
P123 = P1P2P3, q1 = (1 ¡ P1) etc., the probability of censoring is
Pr(ci = 1) = P123 + P12q3S3 +P13q2S2 + P1q2S2q3S3+
P2q1S1q3S3+ P3q1S1q2S2 + q1S1q2S2q3S3:
(11)
The Pij:s will be modelled as unknown parameters constant across individuals.15
For the model represented by the likelihood contributions in eq.(10) the q exits are
still assumed independent. However, from the de…nition of the censoring probability
of eq.(11), all exits must now be estimated simultaneously.
4.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
Allowing for in…nite durations as described above, will hopefully capture some of
the heterogeneity among the unemployed. I will also assume heterogeneity of the
form where the individual speci…c component in the hazard is multiplied with an
individual speci…c error term, v, which is assumed to be independent of both t and
x (see e.g. Lancaster, 1979). The survivor function, conditional on v, is
S(tjx;v) = exp[¡¤(tjx)v] (12)
and the hazard consequently
h(tjx;v) = h(tjx)v: (13)
15 The probabilities may also be functions of individual characteristics, e.g. as binary logit-
probabilities (see Pudney and Thomas, 1995).
14For mathematical convenience the error term re‡ecting heterogeneity is often as-
sumed to be Gamma distributed. The PChazard model with Gamma heterogeneity
is shown in Appendix and the resulting log likelihood function, taking into account




[cilnh(tijx) +(´ + ci)(ln´ ¡ log[¤(tijx) + ´])] (14)
which requires only one more parameter, ´ = ¾¡2, compared to the same model




(¤(tijx) +´) ´ (15)





The density function is consequently
fh(tijx) = hh(tijx)Sh(tijx) =
´ ´+1
(¤(tijx) +´) ´+1h(tijx): (17)
A multiple exit model withGammaheterogeneity in a piece-wise constant setting, is
easily formulatedby using eqs.(15-17) in thelikelihoodfunction ofeq.(9) or, allowing
also for in…nite durations, in the likelihood of eq.(10).
5 Empirical results
In Tables VI and VII the estimated parameters from the hazard models are summa-
rized.16 The base-line hazard is for most exits and subsamples constant across time
or slightly increasing with time. However, for the exit by leaving the labor force, the
hazard shows stronger positive duration dependence, i.e. the probability of leaving
the labor force increases along the unemployment spell.
For the heterogeneity parameter ¾2 we see that heterogeneity of this form is
most important for the exit to subsidized/sheltered employment, for subsamples
A and C. The estimated probabilities of in…nite durations vary quite a lot across
exits and subsamples, where the smallest probabilities are found for subsample A
16 All estimations have been made in GAUSS and the program code is available from the author
on request. Only a random 50 percent of each sub-sample have been used, due to very long
processsing times for large samples.
15(no program participation during unemployment spell). If the model is estimated
with the restriction Pj = 0 for all j exits (these restricted estimation results are not
included in the paper) this leads to an upward bias of the variance of the Gamma
heterogeneity, ¾2
j, and also a downward bias of the base-line.
Table V: Summarized information from estimation of the competing risk model
allowing for in…nite latent durations. Subsamples are (A) No programs and (B)
Only vocational rehabilitation.
Subsample (A) (B)
Exit (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Duration < 180 days (=1) -5.6 -12.2 -4.2 -3.9 -9.2 -5.3
Duration 180-359 days (=1) -5.7 -11.8 -4.0 -3.4 -8.0 -4.3
Duration 360-539 days (=1) -5.5 -11.1 -3.8 -3.0 -7.6 -4.0
Duration > 539 days (=1) -5.8 -10.3 -3.8 -2.7 -7.4 -3.9
Male (=1) + ++ + ++ ¡ ¡ ¡ ++ ++ ¡ ¡ ¡
Age, ln ¡ ¡ ¡ + ++ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡¡ + ¡
UI bene…ts (=1) + ++ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Cash assistance (=1) + ++ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Physical handicap (=1) + ++ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Unemployment rate ¡ ¡ ¡ + + +
“Disability rate” +
“Program rate” ++ + ++ + ++ + + + + + +
University or high school (=1) ++ ¡ ¡¡ ¡
Any prof. experience (=1) + ++ + ++ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
¾2
j 0.000 4.702 0.153 0.801 0.000 0.210
Pj 0.003 0.003 ¤0.040 0.166 ¤0.200 ¤0.106
Share this exit 0.14 0.19 0.49 0.10 0.32 0.47
¡`=n 6.145 7.054
n 15,791 4,769
+ ++= ¡ ¡¡ the e¤ect is signi…cant at the risk-level one percent.
+ += ¡¡ the e¤ect is signi…cant at the risk-level …ve percent.
+=¡ the e¤ect is signi…cant at the risk-level ten percent.
Note: ¤ the parameter is signi…cant at the …ve percent risk level.
Among the individual speci…c variables there are some which have about the
same e¤ect across all subsamples. For example, men tend to be more probable to
leave unemployment for regular, and also to some extent to subsidized/sheltered
employment, and less probable for leaving the labor force. Individuals with a phys-
ical disability, as opposed to a psychological or social disability, are generally more
probable to leave for regular employment. High-school or university education as
16Table VI: Summarized information from estimation of the competing risk model
allowing for in…nite latent durations. Subsamples are (C) One program other than
vocational rehabilitation and (D) Two or more programs.
Subsample (C) (D)
Exit (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Duration < 180 days (=1) -5.7 -13.3 -2.5 -9.2 -12.1 -4.0
Duration 180-359 days (=1) -5.1 -11.9 -1.7 -7.7 -9.0 -2.5
Duration 360-539 days (=1) -4.7 -11.3 -1.2 -7.1 -8.6 -1.9
Duration > 539 days (=1) -4.1 -10.6 -0.8 -5.9 -7.4 -1.3
Male (=1) ++ + ¡ ¡ ¡ + ++
Age, ln ¡ ¡ ¡ ++ + ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ++ ¡ ¡ ¡
UI bene…ts (=1) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Cash assistance (=1) ¡¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Physical handicap (=1) ++ + ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ + ++
Unemployment rate/10 + ++ ++
“Disability rate” /10
“Program rate” /10 ++ ++ + + + + ++ + ++ ++ +
University or high school (=1) ++ + ¡ ¡ ¡ ++ ¡ ¡ ¡
Any prof. experience (=1) ++ + + ¡¡ ¡¡
¾2
j 0.541 2.202 0.520 0.002 0.004 0.002
Pj 0.251 0.188 ¤0.144 0.002 ¤0.387 0.225
Share this exit 0.19 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.19 0.19
¡`=n 6.123 4.628
n 6,104 5,945
+ + +=¡ ¡¡ the e¤ect is signi…cant at the risk-level one percent.
+ + =¡ ¡ the e¤ect is signi…cant at the risk-level …ve percent.
+=¡ the e¤ect is signi…cant at the risk-level ten percent.
Note: ¤ means that Pj is signi…cant at the …ve percent risk level.
well as previous professional experience increases the hazard rate for regular em-
ployment generally. The result that entitlement to bene…ts of any kind, education
and previous labor market experiences increases the hazard to regular employment,
is valid for all subsamples except for subsample B; workers who have participated
in vocational rehabilitation only. Already according to Table V it is clear that after
vocational rehabilitation only, the exit to regular employment is the least probable.
The variable re‡ecting unemployment at the local labor market has a positive
e¤ect on the hazard rate to withdrawal from the labor force and, for those with two
or more programs, also for exit to subsidized/sheltered employment. The former
e¤ect can be interpreted as an indication of that early retirements may still be in
17use for labor market reasons. The overall positive e¤ect of local program rate on all
hazard rates is di¢cult to interpret. It may be that the program rate catches some
other local attributes important to unemployment duration of disabled.
We want to compare brie‡y the results for the disabled workers (aged 25-55) of
this paper with the results for the non-disabled workers (aged 16-55) in the paper
by Carling et al. (1996). The results of the two studies are summarized in Table
VIII. It may be mentioned again that the studies have quite di¤erent assumptions.
In Carling et al. the duration in open unemployment is the variable of interest and
participation in a policy program is considered an exit from unemployment. In this
present study total unemployment - open and time in programs - is the dependent
variable.
Table VII: Comparison of results for disabled and non-disabled workers (from Car-
ling et al., 1996), respectively. The exits for the disabled are (1) Regular employ-
ment, (2) Subsidized/sheltered employment and (3) Non-participation inlabor force.
For the non-disabled exit (2’) is participation in a policy program. "0" means that
the variabel is not included in the model.
Disabled Non-disabled
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2’) (3)
Male (=1) + + ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Age, ln ¡ + ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
UI bene…ts (=1) +=¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Cash assistance (=1) +=¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Physical handicap (=1) + ¡ ¡ 0 0 0
Unemployment rate + ¡ + +
“Program rate” + + + + +
University or high school (=1) + ¡ ¡ + + ¡
Any prof. experience (=1) + ¡ + +=¡ ¡
Share this exit 0.14 0.20 0.41 0.46 0.17 0.15
n 32,609 12,098
Ifwe …rstconsider the proportions leaving unemploymentfor aregular job andby
withdrawingfrom the labor force, respectively, we see that the …gures of the disabled
arealmostthe “inverse” of thoseof thenon-disabled. 14percent of the disabledleave
for a regular job and 41 percent leave the labor force. The corresponding …gures of
the non-disabled are 46 and 15 percent, respectively. Among the disabled workers,
20 percent leave for subsidized/sheltered employment while 17 percent of the non-
18disabled leave for a policy program.17 The proportion of censored observations is
thus 25 and 22 percent, respectively.
The e¤ect of individual speci…c characteristics on the exit through leaving the la-
bor force is practically equal for disabledandnon-disabled. Whenit comes toleaving
unemployment for a regular job there are a couple of di¤erences to be commented
on. First, among disabled, men are more probable than women to get a regular
job, while the opposite holds for the non-disabled. Second, among non-disabled,
entitlement to unemployment insurance bene…ts decreases the probability of …nding
a regular job, while the opposite holds for one of our subsamples of disabled, i.e.
those who do not participate in any policy programs. In addition, while the local
unemployment rate has a negative impact on the job probability for non-disabled,
this is not the case for the disabled. These di¤erences may well be interpreted as
that those disabled who get regular jobs, even if the are few, they get these jobs
quite independently of the local labour market situation. Besides, being entitled to
unemployment bene…ts may both prolong unemployment by leading to less search
and a higher reservation wage (the hypothesis in Carling et al.) but entitlement
may also mean attachment to the regular labour market which makes it easier to
return after a period of unemployment (for example by being recalled to a former
employer). For the disabled workers this latter e¤ect seems to be more important
then the former.
6 Concluding remarks
It is very well known that the labor market opportunities of the unemployed dis-
abled workers in Sweden is troublesome. However, little is known about the special
conditions facing the disabled workers. The focus of this paper has been unemploy-
ment durationof disabled workers only. Two important di¤erences betweendisabled
and non-disabled unemployed is that the disabled participate in considerably more
policy programs and also that about 20 percent of the group leave unemployment
to subsidized/sheltered employment.
We have used a piece-wise constant hazard model, extended to account for unob-
served Gamma heterogeneity and also unobserved heterogeneity due to di¤erences
in search behavior. It appears that the latter kind of heterogeneity is at least as
17 From Table III we know that more than 50 percent of the disabled participate in one policy
program or more. Thus, the disabled participate considerably more in policy programs than do
non-disabled unemployed.
19important as the former.
The results of the present paper have been compared to those of a similar study
of non-disabled unemployed. It appears that for leaving the unemployment by with-
drawing from the labor force, the behavior of the two groups are almost identical
when it comes to variables explaining duration until this exit. However, when it
comes to exit to regular employment there are two important di¤erences between
the groups. First, the quite few disabled who get regular employment after a period
of unemployment, appear to get these in markets “separate” from the non-disabled.
At least we see that the disabled are in this respect not dependent on the local
unemployment rate, as are the non-disabled. Second, the entitlement to unemploy-
ment bene…ts, which in theory and also empirically for the non-disabled, reduces the
probability of getting a regular job, while for the disabled who do not participate
in any policy programs, entitlement increases the probability of …nding a regular
job. We know that bene…ts are expected to increase the reservation wage and lead
to less search activities, and thereby prolong unemployment. However, entitlement
to bene…ts also means that the workers has some previous labor market experience
which may make it easier to …nd a new job or may lead to a recall by the former
employer. For the disabled workers the former negative e¤ect is probably o¤set by
the latter positive e¤ect on the probability of ending an unemployment spell.
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22Appendix
In order to account for individual heterogeneity, assume that there is an individual
speci…c variable v which is a non-negative Gamma-distributed term, with unit mean
and parameter ´, v » G(1;´), where E(v) = 1 and V (v) = ¾2 = 1=´: The density






with E(v) = ®¯ and V (v) = ®¯
2. In our case ® = ´ and ¯ = ´¡1, which means





The conditional survivor function (i.e. conditional on the heterogeneity term) is
then
S(tjx;v) = exp[¡¤(tjx)v] = exp[¡¤v]: (20)
We get the unconditional survivor function by integrating out the heterogeneity
term v from S(tjx;v), as
Sh(tjx) =
R 1
0 S(tjx;v)f(v)dv = ´ ´
¡(´)
R1




0 v ´¡1exp(¡(¤+ ´)v)dv:





















(¤ + ´) ´ (21)
where the simpli…cation follows since the integral equals unity. The hazard rate











This means that the Log likelihood-function will be
`h = clnh(tjx) +cln´ ¡ cln[¤(tjx)+ ´]) + ´ln´ ¡ ´ln[¤(tjx) + ´]) =
= clnh(tjx)+ (´ + c)(ln´ ¡ ln[¤(tjx) +´])
(23)
where h(tjx) and ¤(tjx) refer to the case without heterogeneity.
What then, if there is no heterogeneity and thus V(v) = ¾2 = 1=´ = 0? The
limiting value of the likelihood can be shown to be
lim
¾2!0
(clnh(tjx) +(´ + c)(ln´ ¡ ln(¤(tjx) +´))) = clnh(tjx)¡ ¤(tjx) (24)
which is simply the ordinary likelihood function without heterogeneity.
23